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A Study of the Copperheads during the Civil l?ar.
Thaddeus Stevens described "copperheads" as "weak kneed and
thinskinned unionists, men who were unv/illing to stand hy the Union
unless it protected slavery, men who were willing to denounce the
administration for every forward move, men who made Lincoln's life
a burden in the conduct of the war".-"- If Clement C. Vallandigham,
one of the leaders of the copperhead movement, had been asked to de-
fine what the copperheads were, he most probably would have said
that they were unionists who only desired "the Constitution as it is
and the Union as it was". It was hard for many people in the North
during the Civil War to distinguish any essential difference in the
content of the two definitions. A story is told of an army officer
who was enrolling the farmers of a certain district according to
their political convictions. He enquired of one farmer, "How shall
I enroll you?" "As a Union man," he answered. But the officer
wanted more particular information and asked him what kind of a
union man he claimed to be. The farmer replied that he was "for the
Union as it was and the Constitution as it is". "D—m such an an-
swer," roared the officer, "such men are the d—nest rebels. I en-
roll you as disloyal." 2 This represented the opinion of many north-
ern people during the war.
Townshend defines the term "copperhead" as a sobriquet given
a party that was in sympathy with the Confederate States, giving aid
Woodburn, p. 193.
2' Marshall, p. l6o.
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by endeavoring to thwart measures of the National Government ,1 k
campaign stanza of 1864 gives a general idea of their particular dis-
tinguishing marks.
"Of all the factious men we*ve seen.
Existing now, or long since dead,
Uo one was ever known so mean
As him we call a copperhead,
A draft evading copperhead,
A rehel aiding copperhead,
A growling, slandering, scowling, pandering.
Vicious, states rights copperhead. "2
The term itself meant different things at different times and differ-
ent places. Rhodes speaks of Governor Seymour of New York as the
leader of the copperhead movement in the East in the same way that
Vallandigham was the director in the ^est.3 Brummer, however, who
made an intensive study of New York politics, said emphatically that
Seymour was not a copperhead. ^ Tt was a very elastic term. As a terra
of abuse, it was often used to cover every one outside of the Union
party. The peace democrats accepted the name and tried to give it an
honorable status. The active sympathizer of the South, however, suc-
ceeded more than any one else in giving to the term its present con-
notation.
The word "copperhead" first appeared in print in an article in
the Cincinnati Commercial in 1862 entitled "Comfort for Copperheads".
It must have already at that time become a term in current usage. The
most logical explanation of the origin of the term seems to be that
it came from the badges made from the Indian head of a cent, which
was fastened upon a pin and worn by those to whom the name copper-
head was first applied. 5 Once made a part of the vocabulary of the
newspapers, it spread through the entire E^orth, Tt soon came to be
1« Townshend, p. l6o 2. Townshend, P. l6o. 3. ^^^^^ 225.
^' Brummer, p. 232. 5. Rhodes IV, p. 224.
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used to designate a certain kind of political thought, and as that
thought changed, so the strict meaning of the terra changed. it is
with the origin, growth, content, and results of this political move-
ment that this paper deals.
As a political movement, it was distinctly connected with the
problems that grev/ out of the secession of the southern states and
the Civil '^ar. The political platforms of 1860 dealt with entirely
different matters than those upon which "Copperheadisra" depended for
sustenance. The principal plank in the republican platform of 1860
declared that "we deny the authority of Congress, of a territorial
legislature, or of individuals to give leeral existence to slavery in
any territory of the United States."! The Baltimore convention that
nominated "Douglass affirmed the old democratic platform of 1856 with
reference to the non-interference by Congress with slavery in any
state or territory and added a plank to the effect that the supreme
court was the final arbiter on slavery extension in the territories.
2
The part of the old democracy, that supported "Breckenbridge , also af-
firmed the platform of 1856, but declared that Congress should pro-
tect the slave holders in their property rights in the territories.
2
In this division of the democratic party of 1860, there is no indica-
tion of the issues upon which the democratic party of the North was
so soon to divide. The attitude, however, of some of the northern
democrats was shown in the Baltimore convention when Benjamin Butler
and the Massachusetts delegation withdrew because, as he declared, he
would "not sit in a convention where African slave trade, which is a
piracy by the laws of my country, is approvingly advocated. "3 The
similarities between the two great wings of the democratic party of
^ Chadwick, p. 117
^ Chadwick, p. 108
^ Chadwick, p. II5.
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1860 were greater than the small differences, and the different
candidates of each faction cannot be said to have destroyed the un-
ity of the party in the deeper sense.
The secession of the southern states brought about a division
of the democratic party of an entirely different kind. in fact, it
resulted two different parties in two different nations. Theoretic-
ally, there came to be as many guesses as to the relation between
the democracy of the North and that of the South as there were the-
ories in regard to secession. In the excitement that resulted from
the secession, the political factors from the party standpoint cloud-
ed the greater national issues that were involved. The secession of
and
the south -was the result of a republican political victory Southern
democracy took the matter into their own hands and left their north-
ern political friends to shift for themselves with the victorious
republicans. It was not probable that the democracy of the North
would merge with the republicans: it rather preferred to seek to re-
unite with its old party associates. Hut the southern democracy
built an international boundary between the North and the South and
then the question confronting the northern democrats and republicans
alike became, "IHiat are we going to do about the secession?"
A period of indecision, peace plans, and compromise schemes
followed. Every one was for peace if it could be secured together
with the retention of the Union, and men hesitated to talk about war.
But there was a difference of opinion as to the course of action if
the Union could not be restored by peaceful means. Buchanan, the
democratic president, in his annual message to Congress on January
9, 1660 said, in discussing coercion as a means of dealing with se-
cession, that "aftor much reflection i have arrived at the conclusion
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that no such power (coercion) has been delegated to Congress nor to
any other department of the government. Congress posesses many-
means of preserving it (Union) by the constitution, by conciliation;
but the sword was not Dlaced in their hand to preserve it by force. ''1
In other words, he believed the Constitution and conciliation, or
compromise, the sole remedies. These were two remedies for the se-
cession trouble that a large groiip of democrats soon tried to patent.
The president elect, Lincoln, in discussing proposed coercive
measures, said, "What is coercion and what is invasion? Would the
collection of the united States revenues and the withdrawal of the
use of the mails in a state be coercion? TThat mysterious right to
play tyrant is conferred on a district of the country by merely call-
ing that district a state?"2 Nationalism and the execution of the
United States' laws over all the states were the principles of Lin-
coln's supporters and they believed that the application of them was
the surest remedy for secession.
Did the democracy of the North agree with Buchanan? Whether
they agreed with his political ideas with regard to secession or not,
their attitude tovvards the south was about the same. They dreaded
to think of war waged upon old political allies. Douglass inveighed
against the attempts of the extreniists on both sides to bring on a
war and urged that a national convention or amendments to the Consti-
tution should settle the questions. 3 During the time that Buchanan
was merely filling out his administration, the democrats were active
in organizing peace meetings throughout the northern states.
A peace conference of such a character was held in New York in
^ S herman, p. 212.
^ Harper's Weekly, Vol. 5, p. II9
3 Willis, p. 337.
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Jamiary^ 1861. Resolutions were passed to the effect that the crisis
was produced by sectional passions, and coinproraise was the only re-
medy, as civil war could not restore the union since it was a har-
rier in the path of reconstruction. "Concession, conciliation, and
Compromise" were the methods of preserving the union.-'- The conference
was about to pass a resolution declaring coercion was more revol-
utionary than secession when Ex-Governor Clinton protested against
the trend of the conference, and said emphatically, "Secession is
revolution". Voices from different parts of the hall ouickly retort-
ed, "We are all rebels then".2 The attitude that these peace meetings
showed, undoubtedly encouraged the border states to follow the lead
of the extreme south.^ The democratic press took a similar attitude
towards coercion until the way in which the coercion began changed
the complexion of the situation.
Certain prominent democratic leaders in the north, however,
were giving views to which they adhered during the entire war. un
December 19, 1660, Senator Lane of Oregon said in the Senate, "I
now serve notice that when war is made on the gallant South for with-
drawing from the union which refuses them their rights, the northern
democracy will not join in the crusade.- The republican party will
have war enough at home"/ franklin Pierce in referring to the
chances of war in a letter to Jefferson Davis said that the North,
"if we ever reach the arbitrament of arras, will find occupation en-
ough at horae".^ The mayor of ilew York City, Fermando Wood, stated
that the Union "being a government created by opinion, its continu-
^ Greely Vi, p. 395.
^
Brummer, p. 117; Greely VI, p. 388.
^
Greely, VI, p. 396.
*Logan, p. 260.
^ Jones, p. 258.

ance is dependent on the sentiment which formed it".-^ On January 6.
1861, in a report to the city council, he said that IJew York should
secede from its own state and become a free city. "If the Confeder-
acy is broken up," he said, "the government is dissolved and it be-
hooves every district and community, as well as every ind ividual^ to
take care of themselves. "2 clement Yallandigham of Ohio , who was
a strong democratic leader in the House of Representatives, outlined
early in February 1861 a certain attitude that he preserved during
the entire war. In a speech in the House, he said, "I am all over
and all together a Union man. I would preserve it in all its integ-
rity and worth, mt I repeat that this cannot be done by coercion,
by the swoTd."3 as a remedy for secession he proposed an amendment
to the constitution which would divide the country into four great
sections, a north, a south and a west andan east. On the demand of
any one section, the presidential election was to be taken by sec-
tions and the majority of electors in each section was necessary for
a choice. The consent of all the states of a section was necessary
before any state could secede from that section.^ Needless to say his
plan received no support from his democratic colleagues as it was in
itself destructive of national unity. It may be, that the idea of a
northwestern Confederacy which appeared later in the war may have had
some connection with vallandighara' s proposed amendment.
A little group of Vallandighara' s colleagues began early to at-
tempt to balk any progressive action on the part of the national
government. They voted against the creation of an inquiry coranittee
to investigate why the forts in the tiouth had been given up and why
^ ilcPherson, p . 43 .
2
Logan, p. 255'
3 Life of Vallandigham, p. 149.
Greely VI, p.3 85; Randall, p. 163 .
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aid had not been sent to relieve them.-'- Mr. Thomas in representing
their view said, "You complain that the states have taken public pro-
perty. These forts were permitted to be erected for the defence of
the people of the states, and the federal government has no right to
use them for any other purpose. Whenever the people discern that
they may be used for some other purpose, it is up to the people to
see to it that they are used in their defence. "2 Vallandigham, him-
self, also made frequent trips back to Ohio to dissuade his party
associates from joining with the republicans in any measures looking
towards preparation for war.^ uther leaders took a similar stand.
When the federal authorities seized in Hew York a consignment of
twenty eight cases of muskets in route to Savannah, the mayor of the
city telegraphed to the governor of South Carolina that if he had the
power he would summarily punish that illegal and unjustifiable seiz-
ure of private property."^ In other words, the great majority of the
leaders entered no word of complaint against the action of the south.
Thousands of democrats who had no desire for the dissolution
of the Union, just wanted the secession bluff to go far enough to
destroy the republican organization. Many took part in this encour-
agement of resistance who afterwards risked their lives for the
Union.5 The great mass of northern democrats was interested in the
various peace plans but as far as action was concerned they were in-
ert. There was no leader who had a definite plan of proceedure that
commanded attention and so they waited to see what the new adminis-
tration would do.
^ McPherson, p. 8o.
^ Annual Ency., I86l, p. 210.
^ Randall, p. l6l
.
4 /
Brumraer, p. 126.
^ Blaine, Vol. I, p. 274.

9Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861. Fort Sumter was at-
tacked on April 12, 1861 and on the 15th Lincoln called for 75,000
volunteers. The administration had begun to deal with secession.
The way in which South Carolina as a state opened the war on the na-
tional government did a great deal to lift the local political fog
and made the greater national issues to stand out in clearer relief.
A patriotic wave swept the Korth and a i^reat part of the democratic
press dropped as impractical the old compromise and conciliation
schemes. The New York Herald of April 16, 1661 said, "the democrats
are becoming disgusted with the neglect and ingratitude with which
they have been treated by a section for which they have faithfully
borne the heat and burden of a conflict for so many years. But many
democratic papers took another attitude. To them the South seemed
to be defending itself from the republican hosts and therefore fight-
ing the battles of democracy. The Banger Union said after the fall
of Port Sumter, "Democrats of Maine! The loyal sons of the South have
gathered around Charleston^ as your fathers of old gathered around
Boston, in defence of the s i.me sacred principles of liberty. Your
sympathies are with the defenders of the truth and the right. Those
who have' inaugurated this war are no friends of yours, no friends of
democratic liberty. "2 on April 15, 1861 the ijew York Express said,
"the South in self-protection has been driven to the wall and forced
to proclaim its independence. They fight upon their own soil in be-
half of their dearest rights, "3 Newspapers in every large city ex-
pressed similar sentiments and the question they naturally raised was
whether such publications were traitorous or not. Seven newspapers
Greely, p. 456, Vol. I,
2 Greely, p. 456, Vol. I.
^ Greely, p. 455, Vol, I.
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in rjew York City during the summer of 1861 became so*4renoraous that
» -
^
they were indicted, the mails closed t the|a'» and the printing shops
seized. Attacks on others seemed imminent.-^ Hopes were hung across
lamp posts in other towns and placards "Death to Traitors" indicated
the purpose for which they might be used. 2 These journals, in the
early summer of 1851 did not represent any powerful branch of north-
ern democracy. They seemed rather to be bits of the South, kicking
away in a hostile environment and their influence was very small at
this tirae^ Llost of the democrats acknowledged that something had to
be done to meet the new crisis, rernando wood, who had advocated
the secession of i^jew xork tity, saw the drift of the public ooinion
and issued a proclamation, exhorting the people to ignore the past
and to work for the restoration of "the Constitution and Union as
they existed in the days and spirit of our fathers. Aether this is
to be accomplished by fratricidal warfare or by concession, men may
differ. I call upon the people to unite in obedience of laws and
preservation of order and protection of property.'"^ He even spoke of
the duty "to conquer a peace" The democratic legislature of New
York after the news came of the fall of Fort Sumter passed a bill by
a vote of 102 to 6 for the enrolling of militia on a two year basis
and the men who had formerly spoken of coercion now talked of de-
fense. The six, however, who voted against the bill were democrats
from New York City. 6 in the West Douglass was bringing the democrat-
ic party to accept his new viewpoint that the Union must be preser-
ved and the insurrection crushed.'/ Q^i the day that Lincoln issued
Harper's Weekly, Vol. 5, p. 563, 5^1* ^ Llarshall, p. 148.
^ Brumner, p. l^A , ^ Annual Ency., l86l, p, 531.
^ Brummer, p. 142. ^ Bmimmer, p. 142.
^ Wellis, p. 347.
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his call for 75,000 volunteers, Vallandigham sent out twenty letters
to prominent western democrats to raeet him at Chillecothe to confer
on measures which would arouse the people to a sense of the danger
that threatened the nation from the impending military despotism.
Only four answers were returned to him and one of these was unfavor-
able.
But Douglass died on June 3d, 1861, the war was not over in
three months, and the federal government began to have trouble with
the population in some of the border states who were regarded as
likely secessioni'sts by the government and as party brothers by many
northern democrats. Again, the new party leaders in the north, for
Douglass was gone and the other great democrats were in the Confed-
eracy, were looking for issues by which they could prevent a merger
of the democratic and republican parties. Political barriers had to
be built and it did not take long before plenty of material coulcl be
picked up with which to build them. Papers that had been considered
disloyal in April 1861, catered to the new sentiment. It is need-
less to say that in the late summer of 1861 the democrats were not
as unanimous as in April and May of the same year. Of course, the
war had to be supported, but, -the administration had to be opposed
Many found that in opposing the administration they had to oppose the
war. These were the typical copperheads.
Matters had become a little irregular in Maryland during the
summer of 1861. Maryland had a legislature which was suspected by
the government of trying to take Maryland out of the Union, espec-
1 oBrummer, p, 154.

ially after it had passed resolutions demanding an immediate, peace-
ful recognition of the southern states. Disloyal sentiment was also
rife in the state. It is reported that after the defeat at Bull Run,
a Baltimore gentleman remarked that "after another victory we may
hope for peace". Several of the more dangerous members of the leg-
islature were arrested and General Banks sent the Baltimore police
board to the military prison at Fort Lafeyette, Brooklyn. ^ The civil
courts of Maryland were unable to enforce any proceedings against
the military authorities or secure the release of the imprisoned men.2
But certain democrats in Congress began to protest. Senator pearce
wanted to know by what constitutional right the secretary of state
could order the arrest of men in loyal states where there was no
treason but too much love of peace. 3 Protests of a similar kind were
numerous. Such protests were a good measure for the democrats with
which they might advertise the bad characteristics of the republican
administration.
Direct opposition to the war began also to be shown in various
sections of the country. In August 1851, influential members of
Mozart Hall, New York, told of the formation of an organization "op-
posed to the coercion of states, hostile to arbitrary and unconstit-
utional acts of the present federal administration, and in favor of
peace and the restoration of the Union." ^ In Connecticut, the gov-
ernor called for four regiments of three year volunteers on August
15, 1861. On the 16th, some democrats organized an immense demon-
stration, that they called a "peace meeting" at Saybrook, Connecticut
^ Harper' s Weekly. Vol. 5, p. 499.
^ McPherson, p. 152-3.
Annual Encyclopedia, I862, p. 286; I86I, p. 230-234.
^ Brurimer, p, 159.
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They tried to raise a peace flag, "but union men broke in; a riot en-
sued. Similar riots occurred at Bridgeport. ^ At a large peace ga-
thering at Plymouth, Indiana, Colonel Mulligan tried to teach the
audience that the war was not begun or prosecuted to save the Union.
In spite of great opportunities for compromise, the war continued
for the purpose of breaking down the influence of the agricultural
districts for the advantage of the manufacturing districts and the
republican party. Ke attached the adiainisiration and the war in the
worst terms. Mulligan was arrested, tried by a military court and
kept in prison until after the war.
2
Some of the papers kept up a galling fire on the federal gov-
ernment. The New York Daily News in the suroraer of 1861 said, refer-
ring to the government, "It has given its sanction to murders, mass-
acres, illegal imprisonments, robbery of the treasury, withdrawal of
the securities of life and forshadowed negro insurrections and
authorized anarchy as a necessary portion of the immediate future."
3
When after an indictment, the mails were closed to such newspapers,
certain democratic congressmen became very active in inquiring into
the source of the Postmaster
-'General's power of passing on the merits
of a periodical.^
In Congress, Vallandigham and a group of democrats were offer-
ing innumerable resolutions on the subject of the constitution and
the war. Vallandigham became the great pillar in the support of the
Constitation while his border state colleagues were striking at the
war .5 Xenned.j of Maryland said, "It is my solemn conviction that you
Annual i:ncyclopedia
,
l86l, p. 251.
liiarshall. p. 72.
^ Brunmier, p, 153 .
^ i.icPherson, p. 188.
5 Greely Conflict, Vol. I. p. 56I.
^1
14.
cannot restore the Union by means of the sword. T should he glad
today, (July 10, 1861) to accept any measure of conciliation. i am
willing to make any concession to bring us back to the point where
we were last year, i do not believe we shall get back to it by the
force of arms",l These were the factors in the north itself that
tended towards a destruction of the apparent unity of purpose of
April. 1861.
The first year of the war ended without the attainment of mark-
ed military success by the northern armies and with a tendency to-
wards division in the north people with regard to the support of
the administration and the war.
The year 1862 brought no great military achievements. The
armies continued to try to invade the south and the democrats at home
were trying to embarrass the government in such a way as to count to-
wards their political success in the fall of 1862. it was in this
year, that the word 'Copperhead' was first used in connection with
the obstructionist schemes. The copperheads began to organize, they
became bolder and more of a danger to the government, and the troops
began to speak of them as the fire in the rear. This fire could be
seen flashing out in Congress, in the cities, in rural districts, in
press, peace meetings and democratic conventions, i.^any democrats,
however, limited their opposition only to those who were directing
the war and tried to distinguish between opposition to war and oppos-
ition to the republicans.
Two congressmen from Ohio, Cox and Vallandigham, were very in-
dustrious in the House when it came to pointing out how the adminis-
Annual Encyl., l86l, p, 229.

15.
tration had overstepped its oonstitutional powers and how the union
could be restored by means of conciliation, compromise and consti-
tutional amendments. Thaddeus Stevens introduced a resolution into
the House that provided that if any person in the employment of the
United States in either the legislative or executive branches should
propose to make peace or should accept or advise the acceptance of
such on any other basis than the integrity and entire unity of the
United States and territories as they existed at the time of the re-
bellion, he would be guilty of a high crime. It was aimed primarily
at the Copperheads, and Vallandighara proposed amendments that "the
Union as it was ought to be maintained; also the Constitution, in-
cluding the fifth amendment, that it was a high crime for any civil
or military officer of the united States to advise acceptance of any
peace plans other than the integrity of the federal union and that
whosoever should prevert the war to one of subjugation or for inter-
fering with established institations of the states shall be guilty
of high crime and whosoever should affirm that this house was com-
petent to establish a dictatorship is guilty of high crime" ^ Another
characteristic copperhead attitude was shown in Cox's proposed amend-
ment to a resolution that described the rebels as assasins. "As-
sasins," he moved, "meant all men from the North or the South who had
been instrumental in producing the war and especially those guilty
of flagrant breaches of the Constitution and who are not in favor of
the establishment of the union as it was and the Constitution as it
is." 2 They made a regular business of introducing resolutions that
Annual Pincylop., 1863
,
p' 19.
2
Annual Encylop,, 1863, p. 234.
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called for the investigation of different arbitrary arrests. On
every appropriation bill, they tried to tack on riders provdding that
the money should not be used in the subjugation of the stated or the
interfering with African slavery in the states.^ Yallandighara boasted
that he had never voted one dollar of money whereby one drot) of /Am-
erican blood should be shed in a civil war.* He opposed in Congress
the new oath of allegiance required of West Point cadets which made
allegiance to the nation greater and paramount to that of the state.
2
According to the copperheads, the war had a four fold object; power,
plunder, negro equality, and southern sub jugat ion. 3 Every measure of
the administration tending to strengthen the power of the north was
decried as unconstitutional. But a large part of the democratic par-
ty was faithful to the republican government. In October, 1861,
Tammany Hall passed resolutions in which, referring to the measures
called unconstitutional by the copperheads, they said, "It is imper-
atively required to take every step which may be necessary to secure
the triumph of our arms and that his (Lincoln) measures in this re-
spect will be passed upon by a generous and patriotic people who will
judge with just appreciation of the difficulties with which he is
surrounded. "5 This attitude was essentially different from the ob-
structionist policy of the copperheads.
Yallandighara held a position in advance of most of the copper-
heads in 18G2 in opposition to the war. He even spoke of forming a
confederacy in the northwest equal in size to one third of all hiurope
Gue Iowa, Vol. I, p. 8l.
Life of Vallandighara, p. 173.
Itorshall, p. 143.
A
Life of Vallandighaui, p. 141.
5
Brumnier, p. 172.
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and of securing a maritime boundary by cleaving the way to the sea
by the sword. 1 It was an idea which a few attempted to put into ex-
ecution in 1864.
From Connecticut to Iowa, some democratic leaders were hitting
at the war policy incessantly. The democratic state convention of
Iowa on July 4, 1862, adopted resolutions that^"our Union was formed
in peace and could never be perpetuated by force of arms and that a
republican government held together by the sword becomes a military
despotism. "2 Henry C. Dean of Iowa struck at the war in the charac-
teristic method of. the western copperheads, lie said that the war was
deliberate, systematic, and orderly on the part of the South. It was
not rebellion for everything was done in subordination to the law and
the sovereign power of the states in which it transpired, it was not
revolution for it changed none of the organic laws of the states and
the people armed themselves hy law to repel a threatened invasion of
the country and overthrow of their government and violation of all
their rights. 3 Lincoln had torn up the constitution and in its place
given his own arbitrary will. He had selected the weakest, worst,
and most corrupt men who served him as instruments of usurpation. He
had corrupted one part of the church to engage in warfare with the
other, burned 1200 houses of worship, mutilated grave yards, left
whole cities in ashes, dragged ministers from their knees in the very
act of worship and had had their daughters stripped naked by negro
soldiers. ^ He characterized the army as "a reckless mercenary mob of
unfortunate conscripts driven to slaghter The degradation of
society was complete. Lianufacturers closed their mills and sold theii
Life of Vallandigham, p. 147,
2 Gue, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 8l.
Cue, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 82.
4
Gue. Iowa. Vol. I. p, '62,
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operatives to the recruiting sergeant, merchants refused credit to
the poor in order to drive them into the army to fight the bat-
tles of plunder for the rich Parents might he seen selling
their children in the conscript market and complacently walking away
with the price of their own blood in their pocket."^ Every friend of
peace should oppose the payment of the war debt.
2
This opposition to the war, as long as it was restricted to
isolated individuals, was not very dangerous; but it became apparent
in 1862 that this opposition was organizing itself into secret soc-
ieties that became known as Circles of Honor, Order of American
Knights, K-nights of the Golden Circle and Sons of Liberty. Every
copperhead was supposed to be a member of these organizations, in
the summer of 1862, the first state councils of these societies were
held at Blooraington in Illinois and Indianapolis in Indiana, and as
their secret character made them feared as allies of the South, the
grand juries began investigations.
3
It seems that for many years before the outbreak of the Civil
War, a secret order called the "Knights of the i;olden Circle" had
existed among the aristocracy of the 'jouth. The main political work
of the society seomed to be to get the national government to ac-
quire Mexico and Cuba. The society had included some northern dem-
ocrats and after the outbreak of the war they extended the society
all through the conservative democracy of the i^iorth in order to do
political work. 4 rhe name "Knights of the uolden Circle" was discard
ed for that of the "Order of American Knights", which in turn was
^ C-ue, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 63
^ Gue, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 183.
^ Eddy, Vol. II, p. 585.
4
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Changed to "Sons of Liberty" at the meeting of the Supreme Council
at Uew York on March 1, 1864
[The organization was on a semi-military basis. In each county
one parent temple was at the head of the local lodges in each town-
ship. Each year the parent temples sent delegates to a convention of
representatives. This grand council of the stite sent representa-
tives to the national supreme council. The government of the order
in the state was in the hands of a grand commander and the major-
generals for each military district that the federal government had
created. These of-^icials were elected annually at the state council
and were supposed to direct the activities in their districts. 2 val-
landi;^,hara estimated the membership of these lodges at 500,000 men.
In his report to the government on these secret societies.
Judge-advocate Holt claimed that the leaders used this great organ-
ization for the purpose of raising an armed force sufficiently strong
to establish a Northwestern Confederacy. Until that was accomplished
it was to aid the South in every possible way, discourage enlistments
and furnish rebels with ammunition and protect rebel spies. 3 The
thing in which the leaders succeeded, however, in accomplishing thru
these societies was the spread of their doctrines among the more ig-
norant electorate so as to bring the greater part of democracy over
to the copperhead viewpoint and serve as a strong machine in the fall
elections. 4 The different degrees in the order created a hierarchy
that could bo handled by a few leaders at the ton. iJot much is known
^ Life of Vallandighara, p, 373 ; ::oses, p. 689; Ayers. p. 18-19.
2
Logan, Vol, II, p. 709-61,
3
,Logan, Vol. II, p. 709-761.
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of the ritual except that it was a lesson in states rights, state
sovereignty, resistance to the violation by the government of the
constitutional guaranties, all of which was expressed in lofty bom-
bastic language. ^
In Southern Indiana, Ohio and Illinois, the chief strength of
these organizations lay in the country districts. Further north, the
lodges were chiefly clubs in the cities at which on certain nights
all copperheads were welcomed to indulge in copperhead political
philosophy and poor whiskey, 2 ,^ew lodges were formed by sending
t«,usties into new 'districts and they picked out a few reliable peace
men to whom they exposed all the secrets and the ritual of the order.
These local leaders organized the township temple,
3
Ayer, a federal spy on the organization in Chicago, described
a meeting of such a lodge in one of the worst districts of Chicago,
"Peace" or "Peoria" was the pasu word. A reader hurridly rambled thru
the ritual that dealt mostly about the loftiness of the states rights
and justification for secession. The candidate for initiation swore
to the dogmas that the ritual set forth. Then the older men crowned
around him and expressed their .ioy that he was coming into fellowship
with those who were going to ^ive the abolitionists and Lincoln "par-
ticular hell under the shirt tail". Then last of all the Orand
Seignior explained the mysteries of the initiation and gave him the
distress call "Ocoon'.'^
Williar.i Clayton, a +'armer of Warren County, testified at a
trial that he had been initiated at a congregation in the timber,
^ Judge Kolt s Report. Logan, Vol. II, p. 709-761,
2
,Ayers, passive,
^ Ayer, p. 16.
4
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that he took a long oath of which the only significant part was that
he "pledged to take up arms if required to in the cause of the op-
pressed against the usurpers' war on a people endeavoring to estab-
lish a government for themselves in accordance with the eternal prin-
ciples of truth". He said that he understood the purpose of the or-
der was primarily to heat the republicans at the polls and the force
of arms was only to be resorted to in case of necessity, in case of
a rebel invasion it was understood that they were to unite with the
rebels. 1 The main purpose was political but each saw the purpose ac-
cording to his own hopes; hence, as the society included the south-
erner who lived in the north, and the northern opportunist
,
and the
northern democrat who ioined just because others were .joining, it was
natural that each tried to use it for his own purpose. 2 Even Yallan-
digham said he had suspicions that the order was used to further the
cause of disunion.3 Lincoln understood the amount of revolutionary
energy which the order possessed when he said. "Nothing can make me
believe that one hundred thousand Uidiana democrats are disloyal, to
declare in their secret councils that they were ready to shed the
last drop of their blood to abolish it, (the Union),- to express
their ardent sympathy with its enemies and their ardent detestation
of its officers and supporters was one thing. .But this is t)^e limit
of their criminal courage. Shedding the last drop of one's blood is
a comparatively easy sacrifice; it is shedding the first drop that
counts and these rural Catalines were never quite ready to risk their
skins for their so called principles. "^
^ Kicolay and Hay, Vol. 8, p. 6.
2
Annual Encyi., 1864, p. 43b.
3 Life of Vallandigharn, p. 375.
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The organization of the copperheads coimted in the election of
1662. In the autumn of that year the congressmen who had been elect-
ed in 1B60, had again to face the constituencies of their districts.
The war had not resulted in any ^^reat advance towards the restoration
of the union and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the
military arrests in the north gave the democrats plenty of campaign
material. 1 The democratic candidates, however, had to cater both to
the union democracy and to the copperheads in order to unite both in
their support. Copperheads seeking election spoke o^ war when it was
of advantage to do so. Lord Russel, the British ambassador, said
that opinions in favor of the termination of the ;mr "had been ill
received so that a strong declaration to the contrary was deemed nec-
essary by the democratic leaders. At the present moment, therefore,
the conservative leaders call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution
of the war and reproach the government with slackness as well as of
success. They only want to put the North in a position where it can
demand an armistice with honor, to be followed by a convention where
the South will bo guaranteed certain constitutional rights". 2 [^his
WiS particularly true in the East. But in the "/est the copperheads
were in the majority. Vallandigham in a speech on July 7, 1862, at
Columbus, Ohio, reproached the republicans, "Again I ask you why they
do not take up their muskets and march to the South like brave men
instead of threatening, cravenlike, to fight unarmed ceraocrats at
horae--possibly armed, and possibly not ". 3 Pendleton spoke ut a dem-
ocratic jubilee in Butler County, Ohio, in the summer of 1862. "I
came to see if there were any 'Butternuts'' (synonymous with term cop-
^ White, p. 19y.
2
^
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perhead) in Butler County. I came to see if there were any copper-
heads as my friends of the Cincinnati Gazette are fond of terming: the
democracy of the county, i came to tell you that there are a good
many of that stripe of animal in old Hamilton, i have traveled about
the country of late and l assure you there is a large crop of 'but-
ternuts' everywhere; not only that, but the quality and character of
the nut is quite as good as the quantity."!
Wot only were congressmen to be elected in 1662 but also many
state governors and legislatures.^ m New York, Horatio Seymour was
the democratic candidate for governor and he secured the support of
both Tammany, representing the war democrats, and j.iozart Hall, repres-
enting the peace democrats. 3 Harper's 'Weekly stated, in an editorial,
that "men who are opposed to the government of the United States, who
can find excuses for rebels but none for the chosen rulers of the
country, who have a hundred schemes for destroying and remodeling the
Union but not one for simply maintaining the union of our fathers, --
these men will vote for Seymour".^
The democrats came very near carrying everything in the elect-
ion. The legislatures of the central states were all democratic and
from these states fifty-nine opponents to the administration were
elected to congress while only forty men favorable to it were return-
ed. The border states and the extreme ^Vest gave, however, the repub-
licans a bare majority in Congress. Seymour won in IJew York. The
legislatures of the central states, although democrat ic, were held in
^ VJiliiain Hayes, Vol, I, p. 302,
2 harper' s VJeekly
.
Vol. 6, |j. 691.
^ Bremmer, p. 32?.
4
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check by the republican war governors.^ Vallandigharn received no
benefit from the democratic victories as his district had become re-
publican owing to some gerrymandering by the old republican lefrisla-
ture. Greely said that the democrats won because they stayed at home
to vote while the republicans had gone south to fight. ^ "Dissatisfact-
ion with the results of the war, fear of the coming emancipation pro-
clamation, secret organization of the copperheads, their political
activity, and the doubtful political faith of the candidates that
united both democratic factions in their support, explain in a meas-
ure the result of the election. The election once secured, the lead-
ers could .successfully throw off the mask and show their true spirit.
One great cause of division in the democratic ranks was Lin-
coln's promise to issue an emancipation proclamation.^ to many a
northern democrat, it was flagrant abolitionist violation of a con-
stitutional right of a state. It turned the war into a war for the
negro. The war democrats supported the proclamation. The estrange-
ment is illustrated by Wood's remark that there "cannot be war dem-
ocrats, because that involves the necessity of supporting the policy
of this war. The minute that they did, they wo^ild become abolition-
ists".^ Fernando Wood also sent a letter to Lincoln in iiecember 1862,
which illustrates the copperhead viewpoint on the continuance of the
war. "Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always, and when, af-
ter much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting
the identical questions will intervene and settle tve controversy.
YOU know that since the establishment of christian civilization, ne-
1
Blaine, p. 443 . ^ Randall, p, 209.
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gotiation, and coraproraise have sooner or later determined every mil-
itary conquest, it cannot be otherwise here. Has not the time come,
when, to quote your own language, we should cease fighting and at
least ascertain whether the identical questions about which we began
to fight may not amicably and honorably be adjusted and the terms of
intercourse be once more peacefully established?"! rhe difference be-
tween the war democrats and copperheads grew greater and greater so
that in the elections of 1863, we often find a war democrat as a nom-
inee of the Union party la opposition to a copperhead candidate for
the democratic party. 2
Vallandigham returned to fill out his short terra in Congress in
1863, glorying in the bad prospects of national success. 3 He likened
the IJorth on the slavery question to Gain and the South to ^^bel.
"Gain troubled himself about the sacrifices of Abel and slew him."^On
January 14, 1863 he delivered his great philippic against the admin-
istration and the war. "You have not conquered the South and you
never will. The war for the union was abandoned and war for the ne-
gro begun. Stop fightingi Make an armistice. Accept at once friend-
ly foreign mediation, i sec nothing before the nation but universal
political and social revolution, anarchy and bloodshed, compared with
which the reign of terror wns a merciful visitation."-? His days in
Congress, however, were soon over ^md he went back to the central
states to further the "peace" work there.
Things were not running as smoothly in the central states as
they might have done, '^hen the Illinois legislature^ elected in 1862,
MePherson, p. 296
^
Randall, Vol. 4, p. 209; Greely, Vol. II, p, 510.
^ Annual Kncyl., 1863, p. 265.
^ Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 226.
koses, p, 667.
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met on January 5, 1B63, a copperhead was elected speaker. In his ad-
dress he said, "I trust that you will feel it your duty to enter the
solemn protest of the people of Illinois against the impolicy and im-
becility, which after such heroic and long continued sacrifices,
still leaves this unholy rebellion not only not subdued, but without
an immediate orospect of termination, and i trust your action may
have a potent influence in restoring to our distracted country the
peace and union of by-gone days.l ?he prorogation of the legislature
by Governor Yates on a technicality was the only thing that prevented
the passage of resolutions demanding the recall of r:mancipation Pro-
clamation, an armistice and a national convention of all the states
to settle the difficulties. in Indiana the republicans withdrew from
the legislature so that it lacked the necessary quorum for passing
the proposed bills for the taking away of the military control from
the governor and placing it in the hands of a copperhead committee.
iJo appropriation bills were passed and the national government had
to furnish the state with money until a new legislature could be el-
p
ected.' in Ohio, Governor Todd was arrested under an indictment for
causing the arrest of a Dr. Olds, a copperhead, in 1861. in fact,
the copperheads were becoming bolder and bolder as their power grev;<3
General Burnside was in command of the military district that
included Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio and he decided to take military
measures to combat the copperhead influence. He forbade by military
orders the circulation of the lievi York world thru the mails and seiz-
ed the office of the Chicago Times . Lincoln, however, revolked the
latter order as the agit Lotion resulting from it would have harmed the
' Annual Fncyl., 1863, p. 528.
2
Randall, p. 214.
^ Kandall. p. 214.
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government more than the newspaper^ Burnside also decided to strike
at the peace meetings and issued his ^'General Order Number 38" which
provided thiit "all persons found within our lines who commit acts for
the benefit of the enemies of our country will be tried as spies and
traitors and, if convicted, suffer death. The habit of declaring
sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this district
Persons committing such offenses shall be at once arrested with view
to be tried as spies or traitors or sent beyond our line to their
friends.^
The peace meetings continued to araw large crowds and Burnside*
order was. openly attacked, vallandigham addressed such a meeting at
Ivlt. Vernon, Ohio, on the evening of May 1, 1863. A large parade was
formed where standards inscribed, "Constitution as it is and the
Union as it was", "The Copperheads are coming" and "Liberty" were
carried. People wearing the Indian head badges could be seen every-
where, while soldiers in civilian clothes mingled with the crowd.
^
Vallandigham had a sympathetic audience. He said the war was a wick-
ed, cruel, unnecessary war,— a war not being waged for the Union but
for the crushing out of liberty, the erection of a despotism, a war
for the enslavement of the whites and the freedom of the blacks. "The
sooner the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will
not submit to restrictions of their liberties the better."^ Re warned
the people to remember that it was a wicked abolition war and that
if those in authority were allowed to accomplish their purpose the
people would be deprived of their liberties and a monarchy establish-
ed. He did not counsel resistance to the military or civil law. That
was not needed for,
^
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said he, the people who would submit to such encroachment on their
liberties did not deserve to be freemen.^ As for Burnside's "Order
Number 38", he said that he despised it, spat upon it and trampled it
under his foot. (He undoubtedly spoke the truth.) His authority for
speaking was a higher order than general order number 38. it was
order number one, the Constitution.^
Vallandighara had really dared Burnside to carry out his order
and on the night of May 4, 1863, a squad of soldiers arrived secretly
at Dayton, Ohio, and arrested Vallandigham at his home and took him
to Cincinnati, where he was confined at the Kemper barracks.^ He was
indicted for violating general order number 38, and on May 16, 1663
he was tried by a court martial and sentenced to imprisonment during
the war. On May 19, Lincoln ordered him transported to the Confed-
erate lines. Vallandighara was entertained fairly well in the South,
lie encouraged them by saying that if they could "only hold out one
more year the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dy-
nasty out of existence."^ He succeeded in running the blockade, went
to Canada and before long he was holding conferences with his confed-
erates at Windsor on the Niagara River.
The arrest of Vallandigham caused a great deal of commotion in
the North. The arrest itself was legal, but according to law the
secretary of war was to report the charges within twenty days and if
no indictment was found by the grand jury, the prisoner was to be
freed. ^ Vallandigham' s arrest was typical of thousands of similar
^ Annual Encyl., 1863, p» 475,
2
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cases. His, however, attracted particular attention because of the
prisoner's prominence. Almost every state sent in democratic resol-
utions protesting against the treatment given the "gentleman from
Ohio". In answering the Albany Resolutions, Lincoln defended his
position, iie said, "We all know that combinations, armed in some in-
stances to resist the arrest of deserters, began se^-eral months ago,
that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enroll-
ment preparatory to a draft and that quite a number of assassinations
have occurred from the same sniraus. This had to be met by military
force and this leads to bloodshed and death. I solemnly declare my
belief that this hindrance of the military including the maiming and
murder is due to the course in which Kr. Vallandigham has beon en-
gaged and it is due to him personally in a greater degree that to any
other man."i "He who dissuader one man from volunteering or in-
duces one soldier to desert weakens the L'nion cause as much as he
who kills a union soldier in battle. Yet dissuasion may be so conduc
ted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take
cognizance. "2 He stated concisely the issue when he said, "Must I
shoot a simple minded soldier boy who deserts, while l must not touch
a hair of a wily agitator who enduces him to desert?" ^ in answering
the Ohio resolutions, Lincoln said he would release Vallandigham if
the Ohio democracy would subscribe to three propositions; first,
"that there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and
tendency of which is to destroy the national union and that in your
opinion an array and navy are constitutional means of suppressing^ that
rebellion"; second, "that you will not do anything to decrease or
^ Mcpherson, p, 171.
^
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lessen the efficiency of the array or navy ^hile engaged in the effort
to suppress the rebellion"; third, "that each of you will do all he
can to have the officers, soldiers and sailors of array md navy while
engaged in suppressing rebellion to he paid, fed and clad." 1 It was
the non acceptance of this Dosition that had distinguished the cop-
perheads and the replies of the Ohio delegates were evasive. The
democracy was heavily loaded with copperhead trappings.
A year later in referring to the matter, Lincoln said, ^'A life
is never given up to save a limb. 1 felt that measures, otherwise
unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensible to
the preservation of the Constitution thru the preservation of the na-
tion. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground and now avowit.2 ?he
justification of the arbitrary arrests under Lincoln lies in their
necessity as the only means of preventing anarchy. 3 jhis particular
arrest, however, raised vallandigham to the rank of a martyr amonf?
his adherents and furnished campaign ammunition for 1864.
Arraec resistance to the draft, encouraged by the spread of the
copperhead attitude, ocoured in most of the northern states, in Rush
county, Indiana, a provost marshall
, a detect ive and enrolling officer
were shot.^ In Iowa, a copperhead peace meeting became^ as the result
of a riot between it and a party of unionists^ a drilled and armed
camp of two thousand men that had to be dispersed by state troops. 5
Trouble began in Ohio when, on July 5, IBG^, an enrolling officer was
driven out of Kichland township, iiohle county. The Drovost marshall
1
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with a posse of men went into a village in the township and arrested-
four of the ringleaders, but before they reacred another county a
band of one hundred and fifty men rescued the prisoners. On July 12
and 13, other enrolling officers were driven out of the county and
two companies of state troops had to be sent to quell the little in-
surrection. Bloodshed was prevented when the rural rebel army allow-
ed the soldiers to arrest the original four prisoners and nine others
who had led the rescue party.
1
Riots occurred in the different large cities of the East, but
the draft riot in l^ew York city was the most serious. Seymour had
sent the state troops to join the atmy of the Potomac which was then
engaged in pushing back Lee from Pennsylvania and when the draft was
begun on July 16, 1863, the only protection for the federal officers
was the metropolitan police. 2 on the ISth the names of the conscripts
were published and on the 14th, processions, evidently preorganized
,
began to surge thru the streets. Up to the 16th mobs pillaged and
burned public and private property in the cities and committed atro-
cities on the negroes who fell into their hands. Order was restored
by troops that had been withdrawn from the front, but not until one-
hundred lives had been lost in the riots and ^•£,500,000 worth of pro-
perty destroyed.^ Kiots occurred also in Boston, Jersey City, Troy
and Jamaica. They were not the result of a loyal attitude, but
rather the active translation of the attitude of the copperheads.
Many old democrats who had previously approached rather close
to the copperhead line became about this time ardent war democrats;
Randall, p, 213.
2
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Van Buren, Bancroft and Brady are good examples. The South they said
had turned aside all efforts at compromise and it was now war for
the Union. 1 Van Buren and Bancroft became active leaders in the or-
ganization of the "Loyal Leagues" in opposition to the copperhead
societies.
^
The copperheads were badly mistaken in their ideas concerning
the attitude of the South. Of course the South did not discourage
the growth of the peace party, but they did not encourage it because
of their love for peace. The Kichmond Enquiror said , that northern
democracy were as "fierce in their apostasy of former principles" as
Butler himself but there were still five just men in v)Odom,--one
Pierce, one Vallandighara, one Yv^ood and two Seymours. 3 4s to the
South' s desire for peace and Union, resolutions introduced in the
Confederate Congress in 1863 stated that the only basis for negotia-
tion was a formal and unconditional recognition of the independence
of the Confederate states.^ Articles in the press claimed that they
were "determined to die rather than to live with them (North) in the
same community." Another article warned "the democracy and conser-
vatives of the North to dismiss at once the miserable delusion that
the South can ever consent to enter again upon any terms the old
union. If the Worth will allow us to write the Constitution itself,
we would sooner be under the government of England or France than
under a union with men who have shown that they cannot keep good
faith. "^
^ Bremraer, p. 29?.; Harper's Weekly, Vol, 7, p, 177,
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The copperheads seemed unable to appreciate this view point of
the South. V/hether or not they refused to acknowledge it simply be-
cause they thought it advantageous politically to insist upon it, is
impossible to tell. TVhen the attitude of the oouth became clearer,
the opposition by the copperheads shifted to other ground. Wood at
a peace meeting on June 6, 1863 said, "Experience shows that the
overruling power of God is against us. We cannot succeed in what we
have undertaken".! In other words, they began to agitate for peace
because war was a failure and not because the union could be restored
by peace and concUiiition. Of course they still held out the pros-
pects of reconstruction by peace. "If a democrat were president,"
said Wood, "he would restore the Union without further loss of blood.
He would cease hostilities and take a step to^mrd ascertaining if a
conference could be obtained". 2 it was good campaign material but the
men who proposed it knew also how sound it would be in practice.
The elections of 1863 in the states resulted generally in favor
of the repiiblicans. They won in New York, Connecticut, Rhode island,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Californis and lowa. But this success was not
due to weakness of the copperhead element. On the contrary, they
were better organized than ever before. The reason lay in the merger
of many of the war democrats and republicans in a socalled union par-
ty. 3 I'his is illustrated best in the Ohio election, ijrough, a war
democrat, was nominated by the union party in opposition to vallan-
digham, the democratic nominee. True, Vallandighara was still an ex-
ile, but the democrats thought that his election as governor would be
Harper's Magazine
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a great blow to the national government. The two candiaates them-
selves, suggest the division that had taken place in the old democ-
racy. Brough won by a majority of 101,000 votes and vallandigham did
not return to Ohio as soon as he had expected.^ 7ith reference to the
copperhead movement, the year 1863 was distinguished by active for-
cible resistance to the government, by the decrease of oolitical pow-
er of its leaders in governmental affairs, by a further division be-
tween the tv;o democratic wings, and by the growth of a feeling among
the copperheads that the war was a failure and peace should be estab-
lished on the best terras that could be secured. The following year
marks a further development of these tendencies, a great effort to
secure the national election, and the utilization of the societies
for the promotion of conspiracy schemes.
The information that can be secured in connection with these
conspiracies is very disjointed. The favorite schemes and plans had
to do with the formation of a northwestern Confederacy, such as val-
landigham had suggested early in the war. Agents of the confederate
government were scattered thru the north planning to take advantage
of any tendency or movement that might help their cause and embar-
rass that of the federal government,
Jiiarly in narch 1864, the supreme council of the 8ons of Liberty
met at jiew York and elected Vallandigham the supreme commander of
the order, even though he still kept up his residence outside of the
United States. Vallandigham said that he was satisfied that nothing
beyond a rightful resistance to any attempts to interfere with free-
^ Sherman, Vol, I, p326.
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aom of election was contemplated at the meeting.^ It is impossible
to tell what was discussed at the meeting, but in the same month Jef-
ferson Davis sent agents north to see what plans could be carried out
in releasing confederate prisoners, seizing northern cities und es-
tablishing a new confederacy.^ Captain Hines was one of the chief
agents. He proceeded to Cimada where he got into touch with the Com-
missioner of the Confederacy. Conditions in the North seemed to be
favorable for work of confederate apents for as early as April 1864.
plans had been laid by some of the conperheads for raids on the ar-
senals at Indianapolis, Springfield and St. Louis and the seizure of
control of these three states. One plan provided for the assassin-
ation of Governor Morton of Indiana and the transfer of the office to
Dodd, the head of the Indiana conspirators.
3
Hines visited Vallandigham at Windsor on June 9, 1864 and on
June 11, Thompson, the Confederate Commissioner in Canada, had a con-
ference with Vallandigham. It d6es not seem that Vallandigham himself
arranged any schemes or plans with them but he introduced them to
reliable men who could give them information as to how the secret so-
cieties could co-operate with the confederates."^ Money was needed and
Thompson agreed to furnish money that was to be used by the agents of
the order in promoting the "peace meetings" and the buying of arras
and ammunition. Hines, himself, crossed the border and worked se-
cretly throughout the Worth. At the meeting of the supreme council
of the order at Chicago on July 20, 1864, plans were discussed as to
the way in which this money ought to be distributed and there were
Life of Vallandigham, p, 373.
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talks about planning an uprising. 1 It is iraoossible to tell lust how
trie '
money was distributed
.
whether it was simply divided up among parties
looking out for their individual welfare or used for military prepar-
ation. It is true, however, that contracts were signed for a great
amount of ammunition and that the federal authorities seized thirty
two cases of arms at Indianapolis before they were delivered to the
consignees.2 Rumors of impending revolts were becoming numerous and
the people of the rural districts exchanged their products as soon as
possible for currency, which they considered safer in case hostil-
ities should bread out.^
The confusion is illustrated by the fact that Thompson, the
conmiisioner in Canada thought that the meeting of the supreme council
of the Order of Araoricaji Knights at Chicago on July 20 ^;as to be the
signal for a revolt of all the copperheads. In reporting to the Con-
federate government he told of the formation of a conspiracy for the
purpose of establishing a northwestern confederacy to demand peace.
If peace could not be secured by this move, the Northwest would .ioin
the south in forcing the remnant of the United States to give up the
idea of coercion. Hines was to take charge of the revolt at Chicago
and Castleman. another confederate agent, wr.s to take command at Rock
Island.^ After several shifting of dates August 29th, the day of the
assembling of the democratic convention was agreed upon by a rather
large part of the conspirators. But there ;.as no agreement or under-
standing among all. In southern and central Indiana there seemed to
be^an idea that it was to begin on August 16th.^ Evidently there wasAy6 r
.
p t 4 7 «
2 A yer, p, 47
^ Ayer, p, 69-70.
^ Randall, o. 267.
5
llicolay.ancl Hay,, Vol, 8, p. 7-8.
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no great organized movement.
Two days before the assembling of the democratic convention in
Chicago, people began to pour into the city. From the conversation
that could be heard on streets, it is said that a stranger might well
have thought that he had come to Charleston. On the night of the
twenty eighth, a final meeting was held by the promoters of the re-
volt at the Richmond House. But at the meeting, the Sons of Liberty
told of a rumor that seven thousand federal troops had arrived in the
city and the Sons of Liberty refused to act. Hines realized then
that his game was. over and left Chicago that night .iust in time to
escape arrest.^ In my opinion the idea of an open revolt was not ser-
iously considered by the greater leaders of the copperhead movement.
If they had sone so, they would not have thrown so much energy in
securing political control of the democratic convention that was to
meet on the s.^.me day that the insurrection was to begin. The plan-
ning of revolution was left to the smaller local leaders and to those
who wrought pecuniary profit in plans and preparations.^
Vallandigham was back in the United States .again leading in the
same way as he had done before. He had spent the first half of the
year in Canada but had still remained in close toach with the situa-
tion as supreme commander in the "Sons of Liberty", m February 1864
his case had come up in the Supreme Court and it was decided that an
appeal could not be taken from a military commission to the Supreme
Court. 3 AS to whether he could legally return or not. the practical
difficulties seemed to be the deciding factor. Senator Sherman of
Randall, p. 27.
2
i^icoxay and Kay, Vol. 8, p, 6-10.
^ LdcPherson, p. 175,
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Ohio warned Lincoln that in case Vallandigham was allowed to return,
riots would break out in which Vallandigham would be the first vic-
tim.-'- The attitude of the people is shown by the fact that thirty-
students at the university of Michigan who made a pilgrimage to Can-
ada to see Vallandigham were disgraced in resolutions passed by the
student body.
2
His place in congress was filled fairly well by Long, wood, and
Bayard. Bayard resigned from the oenato because of the test oath
that was required and which he branded as the essential primary tool
of oppression.^ T]iey all struck at the war; but the way in which they
singled out the war democrats shows that the different elements in
democracy were getting further apart from each other, '."ood of New
York said in the House, "This war cannot restore the Union. The dem-
ocratic party cannot be an abolition war party. There can be no such
thing as a war democrat for he can't be a democrat and also a disun-
ionist."^ Long closed a bittor copperhead speech on April 8, 1864
with the statement that nothing could be more fatal for the democrat-
ic party than to seek to come into power pledged to a continuance of
the w.r. Such a policy would be libel upon the creed of the past and
the ideas that lay at the basis of all free governments and would
lead to its complete demoralization and ruin. "I believe the mass
of the democratic party are for peace that they would be placed
in a false position if they should nominate a war candidate for the
presidency and seek to make the issue upon the narrow ground of how
the War should be prosecuted. "5 in short, he presented the issue of
1864 as it confronted the democratic party.
1 ?Sherman, p. 3 24. Harper ' s V^eekly. Vol, 8, p. 19.
^ A nnual Encyl. Vol. 1864, p. 232, ^ Jlnnual Encyl. Vol. 1864, p. 348.
^ Annual Encyl. Vol. 1864, p. 341.
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In order for the copperheads to succeed in the work in which they had
been engaged for four years, they had to secure the nomination of a
peace man for the presidency and then ^et the country to elect him
and the peace party to power.
Copperhead newspapers and peace meeting orators in the Worth
were still lauding the South. The Metropolit?^n of New York spoke of
Virginia as a "Grand old statei May we never see the day when you
shall have to how beneath the yoke of the oppressor. If that day
shall ever come, then will the friends of freedom, the true lov<-rs of
heroism and manhood, mourn the sad fate of a great people who fell
fighting for liberty and independence."^ Two New York papers were
temporarily suppressed for publishing a forgea proclanation supposed
to be issued by Lincoln calling for the drafting of 400.000 addition-
al troops. 2 Tt was published with the intention of instigation i^op-
ular feeling against the administration.
?/hile the newspapers waged war on the Republicans, the copper-
head leaders were busy in practical politics within the democratic
party, for to them it was highly important that the democratic state
conventions should send copperhead representatives to the national
convention. Vallandigham stole down from Canada and reached Dayton.
Ohio, on March 14, and addressed the democratic state convention.^
Later, Singleton, of Illinois. Vorhees, of Indiana and vallandigham
went to New York to help Wood to secure a good peace delegation for
the convention.^ At the state peace convention at Syracuse, resolu-
tions were adopted asking the national convention to declare for an
Harper's Weekly, Vol, 8, p, 243., Greely, Vol. II,
-o. 498.
2
i.^cPherson, p. 192.
Randall, p, 266-7.
4 , .irumner, p, 39b-
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end of the war iDy a vonvention of all the states, and demanded that
peace candidates be nominated. f.lcClellan leagues were immediately
formed to counteract this tendency towards selection of a copperhead
as the nominee. '
The convention met at Chicago on August 29th, 1864. It was to
have met on July 4, 1864 hut the postponement to August did not aid
the democratic cause thru any federal disaster as it had been hoped.
It was opened by the temporary chairman with an appeal for peace and
conciliation between the different wings of the party. '"Ve come here
not as war democrats or as peace democrats." he said, "but as cit-
izens of a great republic." Seymour was elected chairman.^ Seymour
was a peace man. but not of the militant copperhead typo, and his
selection as chairman might indicate a media.n ground on which both
Sides hoped that they could nieet.^ Hut it w.:.s hard to suppress the
more turbulent elements. The abusive speech of judge Miller of Ohio,
who said that there was no real difference between a war democrat and
an abolitionist as they were links out of one sausage made out of the
dog was vigorously applauded.^
The first di.y was devoted to the organization of the convention
On the evening of the 29th. the convention committee on resolutions,
in which Vallandigham and Tilden of Uew York represented the two ex-
tremes, met and tried to work out a platform. There were many dif-
ferent views in the convention. Some were for a cessation of hostil-
^ Brunmer. p, 399,
2
^
iiSH Xaiii Semi-Y/eeklY Tribune, August 30, 1864.
Harper's Weekly
,
Vol. 8, p. 579,
^ Greely, Vol. II, p. 667.
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ities but if the rebels refused the armistice the war was to be push-
ed to the bitter end; others wanted the the platform broad enough so
that anyone who h
-.d particioated in the war could support it and oth-
ers were for peace, with or without conditions. ^ Jhese different
views clashed in the comraitted but vallandigham boasted later that he
had carried the 'war failure' resolution thru the sub- commit tee and
committee in spite of the violent opposition of the war democrats.
2
The resolutions which were report-d were accepted on the next day by
the convention with only four dissenting votes.
3
The war failure resolutions showed the strength of the copper-
head influence in democracy that was reoresented in the convention.
The resolutions stated that "after four yeare of failure to restore
the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence
of a military power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution
itself has been disregarded in every ^mrt and public liberty and pri-
vate right alike trodden dovm and the material prosperity of the
country impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and public welfare de-
manded that immediate efforts be m-ide for a cessation of hostilities
with a view to an ultimate convention of all the states or other
peaceful means to the end that peace nay be restored on the basis of
federal union of all the states. " ^ Cessation of hostilities, the fail-
ure of the war. criticism of infractions by the military power had
been the food on which the copperheads had dieted during the war and
now they had succeeded in making them the platform of the democratic
party.
Blaine, d, 525.
2
BrxKoraer, p. 405.
3
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They were not however as successful in their choice of a pres-
idential candidate. General licClellan was a popular man but he had
been very instrumental in the beginning of the war in arresting mem-
bers of the Maryland legislature and in susoendinp- the writ of hab-
eas corpus in that region. He secured the nomination, however, by a
majority of ninety eight over all of his competitors. it looked like
a compromise in which the peace democrats wrote the platform ana the
other democrats made the presidential nomination.^
It is rather hard to reconcile LicClellan' s statements on his
acceptance of the nomination with the platform on which he was sup-
posed to stand. He said, "I could not look into the faces of my gal-
lant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody
battles and tell thera that their labors and the sacrifices of so
many of our slain has been in vain, that we have abandoned the union
for which we have so often periled our lives." Me repudiated the
thought of peace just for the sake of peace. "Union is one condition
of peace, ^-e ask no more. if frank, earnest, persistent effort to
obtain these objects should fail, the responsibility for the conseq-
uenses will fall on those who remain in arms against the Union. Bo
peace can be permanent without the union. " ^ :icClellan tried to rob
the nlatform of its copperhead trimmings but in doing so he made them
all the more evident.
The differences between the conventions platform and the nom-
inee's platform did not lead to much of division in the party because
of, fas Long expressed it) a lack of enthusiasm.^ There was, however,
^
Blaine, 529.
I:ew York Sflmi -V'p.pV Iv Tribunp.
,
September 9, 1864.
^ Greely, Vol. II, p. 669.
^ Annual Encyl., 1864, p. 795,
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considerable dissatisfaction among the ultra copperheads concerning
the nomination of McClellan. The New York Daily News in publishing
the platform, said, ^'we accept the plat-Porm adopted by the convention
as a great triumph for the peace party" but on the publication of
McClellan' s letter of acceptance it said, "The man nominated to re-
present its (democratic) principles is therefore no longer the nom-
inee of the Chicago Convention has therefore no claim on the
support of democracy as such. General IJcOlellan's voice is for war."
McClellan had made the issue on the way the war was to be con-
ducted and not on outright peaoe. Long/Ben.lamin Wood, and General
Singleton .of Illinois tried to assemble a thoroughbred copperhead
convention at Cincinnati but it failed because no interest in it
could be aroused.^ '/hile the copperheads growled about the democratic
nominee, the war democrats railed against the platform. General Dix.
a prominent leader of that faction said at a rally at Sandusky, Ohio,
on October 2nd, "I believe that a cessation of hostilities would in-
evitably and directly lead to a recognition of the sout-ern states,
and when i say this T need hardly add that i can have no part in any
political movement of which the Chicago platform is a basis. A peace
which shall restore the Union and the Constitution lios in a steady,
persistent and unremitting prosecution of the war." 3
The result of all was that the democrats did not know whether
they were supporting McClellan or the r;latform when they voted the
democratic ticket. A cartoon in the issue of' Harper ' s Weekly of Nov-
ember 12, 1664 showed Jonathan, uncle Sam's predecessor, seated on a
Harper' 3 Weekly, Vol.8, p. 585.
^ Annual Encyi., 1864, p. 795.
2
Brummer, p. 422.
J
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horse representing Lincoln.
-,7hile shrubbery in the distance was lab-
eled "Compromise". "Peace" and "Chicago" and partly hid the McClellan
horse. Jo on Bull had stopped Jonathan and tried to induce him to
change horses; but Jonathan answered, "Old Abe is Just where i can p
put my finger on him; as for the other, though they say he is some-
where out in the scrub yonder, I never know just where to nnd him."^
This was the way in which the I3emocratic party a-opeared in 1864; no
one knew just what they did stand for.
In the campaign of 1864, the word "copperhead" was used in its
broadest sense. The republicans used it to cover any one who would
not give t-heir support to the Union party, and it showed to many neu-
tral democrats the great copperhead control of their party.2
-he suc-
cess of the Union arms under Grant and Sherman pointed towards a s
speedy termination of the war and hence the "war failure" resolution
of the peace party did not strike as hard as it would have done in
1852 or in 1863. -he election of 1864 had been a goal of all the
copperhead efforts. They had at last succeeded in making their plat-
form the platform of the democratic party but the nomination of Mc-
Clellan alienated part of their faction in a manner similar to the
way in which the platform had alienated the war democrats. in the
election they did not "sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of existence. "3
The loss of the election .md the close of the war by the conquest of
the south ended the issues upon which the copperheads depended for
existence; but the spirit lived on in the democratic party. The re-
publicans referred to the copperheads whenever they waved the bloody
Annual Encyi., 1864, p. 798.
2
Harper' 3 Weekl^r^ Vol. 8, p. 736,
^ KarperAs Wefikly^ Vol. 3, pasoive.
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shirt ?• and it was not until 1870 that Vallandigham accepted the re-
sult of the Civil war.
The connation of the word copperhe:.d has come to bring an idea
of secret, traitorous conspiracies in the aid of the South. The word
is hard to define, but it seems tome that it means a certain attit-
ude of part of the people in the rjorth,—an attitude that encourage
the people to do what they coald to obstruct the progress and actions
of the federal government. The motives behind the attitude ranged
from purely party political aims to traitorous designs to directly
aid the South. The later motive is the one that we ordinarily think
of; but in fact it was a political motive that induced most of the
democrats to assume this attitude and become copperheads.
Every account of the copperhead movement seems to deal exclus-
ively with startling revolutionary schemes and traitorous secret soc-
ieties. The emphasis has been put in the wrong place. The copper-
head movement does not represent anything which is quite as concrete
as that. Kevolutionary plot, and traitorous societies existed but the
copperhead movement as a whole represents the attitude of obstructing
certain policies of the republican administration and the main purpose
of the copperhead movement lay in the T^olitical field. The internal
dissensions that arose in the Worth were not conflicts between trai-
tors and loyalists, but rather struggles between two political fac-
tions that sought to find differentiating factors in the adoption of
two different points of view on the prosecution of the war.
1
Randall. Vol. Iv, p. 308-310.
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